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Abstract 
GAUSS (Galileo-EGNOS as an Asset for UTM Safety and Security) is a H2020 project1 that aims 
at designing and developing high performance positioning systems for drones within the U-Space 
framework focusing on UAS (Unmanned Aircraft System) VLL (Very Low Level) operations. The 
key element within GAUSS is the integration and exploitation of Galileo and EGNOS exceptional 
features in terms of accuracy, integrity and security, which will be key assets for the safety of 
current and future drone operations. More concretely, high accuracy, authentication, precise 
timing (among others) are key GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) enablers of future 
integrated drone operations under UTM (UAS Traffic Management) operations, which in Europe 
will be deployed under U-Space [1]. 
The U-Space concept helps control, manage and integrate all UAS in the VLL airspace to ensure 
the security and efficiency of UAS operations. GAUSS will enable not only safe, timely and 
efficient operations but also coordination among a higher number of RPAS (Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft System) in the air with the appropriate levels of security, as it will improve anti-jamming 
and anti-spoofing capabilities through a multi-frequency and multi-constellation approach and 
Galileo authentication operations. 
1 This project receives funding from the EU H2020 Research & Innovation Programme under grant 
agreement No 776293 
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The GAUSS system will be validated with two field trials in two different UTM real scenarios (in-
land and sea) with the operation of a minimum of four UTM coordinated UAS from different types 
(fixed and rotary wing), manoeuvrability and EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) 
operational categories. The outcome of the project will consist of Galileo-EGNOS based 
technological solutions to enhance safety and security levels in both, current UAS and future UTM 
operations. Increased levels of efficiency, reliability, safety, and security in UAS operations are 
key enabling features to foster the EU UAS regulation, market development and full acceptance 
by the society.  
1. Introduction
The GAUSS solution will develop and validate the following modules in the unmanned aircraft, 
GCS (Ground Control Station) and UTM service provider systems (see Figure 1): 
• GNSS-INS positioning module based on multi-constellation and fusion with on-board
sensors.
• GNSS anti-jamming and anti-spoofing security module.
• UTM Coordination module: Identification, permits and flight plan and emergency
management.
• UTM Trajectory manager: Generation, validation and coordination of primary and
escape/alternate trajectories.
• UTM communications infrastructure (Security module and surveillance broadcast
communications).
The project is currently in development phase. The UTM Concept of Operations has been 
established, relevant use cases and scenarios have been identified and the system requirements 
have been defined. The work is currently focused on developing the positioning system, ensuring 
EGNSS signal integrity and security and developing the UTM technologies that will allow the 
coordination of multiple drone operations. The consortium is coordinated by everis Aerospace 
and Defense (ES) and includes Rina consulting (IT), the Spanish National Research Council (ES), 
Aratos Systems (NL), Cranfield University (UK), University of Seville (ES) and Satways Ltd. (GR). 
Figure 1: GAUSS system diagram. 
The functional architecture is organised so it can create situational awareness for all the actors 
involved in the distinct stages, as shown in Figure 2. The key capabilities can be expected as 
follows: 
 To define VLL airspace structures for meeting the needs of the U-Space community.
 To configure VLL airspace dynamically according to predicted traffic demand and
unforeseen events.
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 To accommodate VLL traffic demand, following VLL airspace structures, capacity,
operational requirements and procedures.
 To maintain a safe and orderly flow of unmanned traffic depending on the type of
unmanned operations and the level of services associated to a given VLL airspace.
 To separate unmanned aircraft from other unmanned and manned aircraft and other
hazards such as adverse weather conditions.
 To facilitate the situational awareness to the relevant operational actors in a demand
basis, commensurate to the stage of the operation.
 To mitigate the RPA-out-of-control hazards developing into harms for operations -
ranging from abnormal to emergency states- by means of taking contingency
measures commensurate to the scenario.
 To enable all the above functions by building a technical layer for communications
and coordination.
2. Precise Positioning
UTM requires to know precisely the state for every UA in the airspace, i.e. we need to know its 
position and velocity, both linear and angular. Usually, this kind of vehicles have fast dynamics: 
fixed-wing UA tend to have fast translation dynamics, while multirotor type can produce 
aggressive attitude changes. On the one hand, in order to capture these eventual fast dynamics, 
we need sensors that are able to sample at high rates, e.g. inertial measurement units (IMU), 
which measures linear acceleration and attitude change rates and can operate at 1 kHz. On the 
other hand, this kind of sensors cannot observe the full-state we are interested in. The non-
observable states are obtained integrating the inertial sensor measurements, which apart from 
the true state measure it also includes disturbances such as noise or biases. In order to reduce 
the drift produced by the integration of both the bias and the noise, it is needed to add other 
sensors to the aircraft so the state becomes fully observable. A good choice when operating 
robots outdoors is to mount a GNSS receiver, which will give us at least, a global positioning. 
Data coming from different sensors will be fused using state estimation techniques. The algorithm 
used has to be fast enough to process the high rate data streaming produced by the inertial 
sensors. In the case of the GAUSS project, we use a Graph- SLAM [2] approach. This technique 
is based on using a graph whose nodes are used to represent poses of the robot at different 
points in time. The edges between nodes represent movement constraints and are directly linked 
with the measurements taken by the sensors. 
The aim of GAUSS is to test the advantages given by the satellite system Galileo. One of its 
claims is the positioning accuracy it provides to devices using its satellites. However, the position 
accuracy computed using GNSS satellites also depends on the techniques used, e.g. there are 
multiple ways of correcting the biases present in the pseudoranges2. 
Therefore, we will perform a benchmark of different possible ways of computing a position by 
using GNSS measurements. Eventually, this position will be used in our Graph-SLAM sensor 
fusion technique in order to assess its validity and accuracy. 
Galileo satellite system is the core asset of this project, which means that all the solutions 
proposed will be constructed around it: Galileo-EGNOS will be tested3, together with solutions 
involving Galileo plus others GNSS constellations. 
The main idea is to test how Galileo performs using standard positioning techniques presented in 
[3]. To do so, different positioning scenarios will be tested in order to validate Galileo Satellite 
System. Thus, both code and carrier measurements will be processed using RTKLIB library. 
2 It is the pseudo distance between the satellite and the receiver. It contains the prefix pseudo as it is affected 
by perturbations that modify the true distance, e.g. the ionospheric delay. 
3 At the date of this report, Galileo is yet not fully compatible with EGNOSS, even though it will be in the 
future. Thus, GPS will be used as a substitute of Galileo 
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The different scenarios first consider the cases of single frequency (L1 band) and double 
frequency (L1 and L5 bands). For each case, different corrections are applied to the ephemeris, 
troposphere delay and ionosphere delay. Ephemeris can be defined with Galileo broadcast signal 
and can also be corrected using both broadcast signal and SBAS (EGNOS in the case of Europe). 
Figure 2: GAUSS Functional Architecture. 

































Table 1 Table showing the different GNSS positioning scenarios considered in the project. 
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The simplest method does not consider any correction on the troposphere or ionosphere terms. 
Then, the broadcast corrections are applied to troposphere (Saastamonien model) and 
ionosphere delays. SBAS troposphere and ionosphere corrections are also tested. In the case of 
double frequency, the ionosphere effect will be mitigated using the ionosphere- free linear 
combination. These scenarios are summarised in Table 1 and their validation and accuracy will 
be measured using a ground truth receiver correctly positioned. 
3. Security module
During flight operations, drones rely on a GNSS system in order to compute its position. This is a 
great strength, since accuracy of GNSS is sufficient to perform a flight under excellent conditions. 
However, it could be also a great weakness because the dependency to GNSS is thus 
considerable. The use of GNSS within this application adds threats to be addressed with a specific 
threat analysis to cover the weaknesses of the system towards GNSS intentional and 
unintentional attacks. As reported in [4], the most valuable threat to be considered with the GNSS 
navigation system is Electromagnetic Interference (EMI). As reported in [5] and [6], EMI can be 
divided into two main categories: spoofing and jamming. 
3.1 Jamming 
Jamming is the intentionally disruption of wireless signals through the use of an over-powered 
signal in the same frequency [7]. GNSS jammers transmit a signal of interference where the 
carrier is located in the frequency band used for satellite navigation [3]. Jamming occurs in three 
main forms: broad-band noise, narrow band signal and pulsed signals. Among these, the jammer 
case can be either sinusoidal or chirped, the latter being the most dangerous one since not easily 
blanked via receiver filtering (indeed most commercial GNSS receivers already implement the 
ability to put narrow frequency notch within the receiving chain [8]). 
3.2 Spoofing 
Compared to the previous technique, spoofing is more complicated to be achieved. Spoofing 
attack is a transmission of manipulated or simulated GNSS signals. In this kind of attack, the 
offender can provide false PVT information to the GNSS receiver and deviate the RPA from the 
flight route. This is true in this context since the signals broadcasted by the offender are powerful 
enough to dominate the ones of the real GNSS constellation. In a simple spoofing scenario where 
a trajectory is generated which deviates considerably from the real trajectory, spoofing can usually 
be detected. In a more sophisticated scenario the spoofed position/ velocity / time solution can to 
a great extent have the same properties as other independent systems. Spoofing is then difficult 
to detect [4]. 
3.3 GNSS Jamming and Spoofing Security Controls 
In addition to the already implemented mechanisms in Galileo system (e.g. Navigation Message 
Authentication, Code Based Authentication, etc.), given the above possible classes of attack on 
the GNSS signal we identified in literature several types of counter- measures with different level 
of effectiveness: 
• Signal Processing-based techniques: values or trends in parameters like amplitudes,
carrier and code phases are stored in order to generate an historical database and
looking for GNSS signal anomalies. Another option is to look for distortions in the
autocorrelation functions;
• Encryption-based techniques: for these group of mitigation approaches, encryption
of spreading codes are employed in order to ensure the authenticity of the signals.
Among others, symmetric key encryption, delayed symmetric key (interleaves short
segments of a symmetric-keyed Spread Spectrum Security Code, SSSC, with long
segment of predictable spreading codes) and asymmetric private/public key (this
method is known as Navigation Message Authentication, NMA) can be used. Note
that for each of these methods, modification of the satellite signals is required since
addition of an encryption layer is needed;
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• Drift-based technique: an attack is spotted by analysing the rate of clock drift: if it is
larger than the usual drift of the oscillator probably an attack is ongoing. This
technique checks changes in clock fix. If external IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit)
are available, kinematic constraint can also be exploited calculating estimation of
speed, heading and position. For this reason, changes in the receiver position and
track are also checked;
• Signal geometry-based technique: GNSS signals are supposed to be sent from a
wide set of different angles while spoofed ones can come only from a single point. A
multiple receiving GNSS antenna system could calculate the direction of arrival of the
navigational signals and discerns spoofing signal. Another way to spot spoofing
signal by taking advantage from this technique in a single antenna system on a
moving platform is looking for phase shifting consistent with the platform motion.
In order to strengthen security needs in GAUSS applications and to improve robustness and 
reliability of detection, a suitable solution consists in the implementation of a set of detectors jointly 
working on the received GNSS signal and looking for signal anomalies. Each detector works on 
different aspect of the signal and therefore being able to detect different types of attacks. The 
selected detectors are optimal in the way their joint use provides high probability of detection in 
the most common operational scenarios where the GNSS signal integrity could be at risk. 
4. UTM
In this section, we present details about the different modules of the GAUSS-UTM and the 
communications infrastructure involved in it (see the GAUSS system diagram in Figure 2). UTM 
is envisioned as a subset of ATM that is aimed at the safe and efficient management of UAS 
operations through the provision of facilities and a seamless set of services in collaboration with 
all parties and involving airborne and ground-based functions. Such a system would provide UTM 
through the collaborative integration of humans, information, technology, facilities and services 
supported by air, ground and/or space-based communications, navigation and surveillance [9] . 
4.1 Communications 
To accomplish the management of UAS traffic in a UTM environment, communications within 
GAUSS need to be robust, reliable and have high availability. While not requiring the level of 
performance expected for operations in controlled airspace using aviation safety spectrum, 
communications for UTM must nevertheless perform reliably to provide a sufficient level of system 
safety. To this end, the communications between all systems interacting in the UTM of GAUSS 
will be developed by using encryption algorithms to ensure integrity and availability. Currently, 
research analysis of the existing algorithms and their convenience for the UTM has been 
conducted and the selection of AES 256 algorithm was deemed necessary considering the 
parameters after a study on the capacity and performance requirements of usual RPAS 
operations. Thus all considered communication flows will be encrypted using the AES 
(Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm [10]. The AES algorithm is a symmetric block 
cipher that can encrypt (encipher) and decrypt (decipher) information. 
Based on the communications policy, the technical performance requirements, communications 
procedures and architectures the communications can be classified in two categories: low data 
rate communication, such as command signal sending and receiving with relatively small size 
packets and high data rate communication for payload download and streaming of data. 
The solution to be developed will include a hardware approach which is much faster, reliable and 
well suited to both kind of high bandwidth real time encryption needs and low data rates. The AES 
256 algorithm will be integrated into an FPGA-based system which stands for a straightforward 
process because the data manipulation and transformation performed by the AES algorithm can 
be easily incorporated into the chips blocks [11]. Crucial parameters such as length of the 
message, headers as well the communication rates (RPAS to GCS and GCS to UTM) will be 
adjusted within the AES body with the aim to increase the performance and reliability in the 
communication. For the encryption/decryption processes in the UTM station a software based 
approach will be developed. 
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The designed architecture for the AES to be implemented will consist of three modules: the 
Communications module, the Encryption module and the Decryption module. All three will be 
implemented on both the FPGA-based system as well as the processors in the ground stations 
and UTM stations, and will work without interfering with the currently implemented main system 
and its functions. By applying such an approach arises the benefit of having an efficient and 
secure end-to-end communications protocol that can be used for multiple applications regardless 
of the functions that are performed by the system. Extended research has already been 
conducted towards the authentication and security through efficient key negotiation. One key 
aspect within AES proposed solution is the key generation and sharing between systems. The 
owner of the key will be the UTM ANSP. Each time a RPAS registers with a specific UTM to 
request permission to operate within certain airspace, and in the case that the UTM ANSP grants 
this permission, a key is generated and shared through a secure SSL-based virtual private 
network (VPN) with the RPAS-GCS. This key will be shared between GCS and the RPAS FCS 
(Flight Control System) by means of a tethered communications, reducing the risk of interception. 
4.2 UTM coordination 
The GAUSS-UTM coordination is based mainly on the services described in Figure 2. These are 
e-Registration, e-Identification, Flight Planning management, Monitoring and Emergency
Management. Another important UTM service for GAUSS-UTM coordination is the Monitoring
service. In the following we are going to define briefly these services.
• E-Registration process is a pre-flight requirement; it is mandatory before submitting a
flight plan. There are commercial UTM applications which include this functionality. In this
sense, we will integrate the GAUSS-UTM with one of them. Otherwise we will consider
that the e-Registration process has been fulfilled and the required data will be generated
in a database.
• e-Identification service allows the localization and identification of a UAS while flying. This
identification allows gathering all the information from a registry. The localization of the
UAS is sent to the Tracking service as a position report. The e-identificacion service will
be implemented in GAUSS using ADS-B and RPA state combination of messages.
• Flight Planning Management service receives a flight plan from the operator and provides
an approval or rejection answer, depending on the mission, scheduled flights, geofences
and regulations. Since it is a pre-flight process it does not fall within GAUSS scope of
work. We can manually define flight plans that fulfil the requirements; this flight plans
could be stored in the scheduled flights database. This feature is included in most of
existing commercial UTM applications, so it might be integrated within GAUSS if the
proper API (Application Programming Interface) or SDK (Software Development Kit) is
available.
• Monitoring service will estimate and calculate potential problems that could appear during
a flight. This service will run an independent instance for each flight. We will consider the
following events:
 Geo-fences: approaching, crossed.
 Geo-cage violation.
 Potential collision with other RPA: close track, likely collision.
 Deviation from plan: time, separation.
It could also include weather related event, but we consider that this is out of scope in 
GAUSS. Moreover, this service could be triggered when a mismatch between the flight 
plan and the actual RPA track occurs. We assume that the Monitoring service is always 
running for each flight and the information is only forwarded when one of the mentioned 
events is detected. 
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Figure 3: Emergency Management, Monitoring and Tactical Deconfliction U-Space services. 
• Emergency Management functionality will include three different features (see Figure 3):
 Send to Remote Pilot in Command (RPIC) emergency information or actions.
Emergency information means reporting events that could affect the flight (for
example, fly away RPA in close proximity or approaching to jammed GNSS signal
area). Emergency actions include manoeuvres to avoid or reduce the effect of
these events.
 Receive from RPIC emergency reports. Depending on the event, these reports
could trigger sending emergency information to other RPAs. Therefore, this
service will receive emergency report from flying RPAs and it will also detect
emergencies that could arise from an unexpected RPA behaviour (for example,
diverting from flight plan). Then decision-making techniques will provide proper
actions or trajectories to mitigate the effects of the hazards.
 Detection of jamming or spoofing of the GNSS signal together with jamming of
C2 link or UTM communications are considered emergency events. This service
will receive from each RPA the status information of the communications links
(C2 and UTM) and GNSS signal and it will use this information to build a
jamming/spoofing map. This map will be part of the decision-making process to
submit emergency actions to RPIC
4.3 UTM trajectory management 
Management of RPA trajectories in GAUSS is achieved using two different U-space services: 
Strategic deconfliction and Tactical deconfliction. 
• Strategic deconfliction. This service (see Figure 4) provides deconfliction assistance to a 
drone operator before the flight. If a submitted flight plan is not feasible, this service will 
propose a new flight plan to the operator. Then the operator can accept this new plan or 
submit a new one. This service is not mandatory in GAUSS, since it is a pre-flight process, 
but the algorithms implemented for Tactical deconfliction will be used offline for this 
purpose. As far as we know, none of the existing UTM applications have available this 
feature at this moment. As shown in Figure 4, this service takes as inputs the geofences 
(static and temporary), the drone operator database and the scheduled (approved) flight 
plans. The output is an update of the scheduled flight plans.
• Tactical deconfliction. As described in [12], this service provides real-time deconfliction 
assistance while flying. The service interacts with the Monitoring and the Emergency 
Management services, as shown in Figure 5, and it is triggered whenever a modification
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of the scheduled flight plan is needed due to unexpected events that could compromise 
the separation from other aircrafts, the violation of a geofence or due to an emergency 
situation. In GAUSS, the RPA will not receive directly the deconfliction information; this 
information will be received by the RPIC and he will take the responsibility for rejecting or 
executing the proposed actions. If the execution is validated by the RPIC, then the 
proposed actions are forwarded to the RPA. 
Figure 4: Strategic deconfliction U-Space service 
4.4 UTM Web Application 
Finally, an interface is needed to visualize flights, statistics, trajectories and geospatial objects 
(geofences, geocages), emergency information etc. In GAUSS this will be a modular Web 
application (for desktop and mobile devices) built on React.js and REST Web services and a 
PostgreSQL/PostGIS backend database. It is a high performance map-cantered application that 
is also able to communicate in a two way fashion with other commercial UTM solutions via well-
defined APIs. Both civil aviation ADS-B and UAS traffic is consumed and displayed in order to 
assist pilots that choose to embed the web application into their GCS or display it through their 
smartphone. 
Figure 5: View of the GAUSS UTM Web app 
5. Conclusions
The use of RPAS is growing rapidly worldwide and there are several initiatives (public and private 
funded) working towards ensuring a safe and efficient operation; one of the main concerns in all 
drone operations is the importance of the positioning information in terms of performance, safety 
and security. GAUSS addresses this by developing a system able to provide accurate, reliable 
and secure positioning information. A combination of internal sensors together with multi-
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constellation and multi-frequency satellite systems (with Galileo as the core asset) through 
GraphSLAM algorithms offers a comprehensive solution, able to offer accurate information, where 
several corrections can be applied (ephemeris, troposphere, ionosphere, etc.). This adjusted 
signal provides higher robustness against jamming and spoofing. Furthermore, additional 
techniques can be applied to increase the security levels: signal processing-based, encryption-
based, drift-based and signal geometry-based. Data flow through UTM systems may also be 
vulnerable, this is why such communication should be encrypted; the encryption procedure 
usually depends on particular system needs (bandwidth, data rates, etc.) and in GAUSS the AES 
256 algorithm together with a hardware approach is found to be the fastest and most reliable 
option. Finally, the safety of drone operations is also highly dependent on the UTM services which 
should be able to provide coordination and trajectory management of several flights 
simultaneously. These services were drafted by SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research) 
[1] and are in the process of being updated by the CORUS project.
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